"[T]he ideally best Form of Government is Representative Government." Such is the central thesis of John Stuart Mill's "Considerations on Representative Government. Mill's ideas on the proper structure of such a government vary considerably from what might be called a common understanding of the subject, but his reasons for asserting it are clear enough.

First off, Mills recounts the various reasons why despotism, even under a "good" despot, is an inferior form of governance. Mills the improvement of the people to be the primary duty of society and, as such, prefers a form of democracy oriented towards the end of developing the skills of the people. Political discourse and participation, he avers, are the principal means society has at its disposal for achieving this end. Despotism or oligarchy requires a passive, submissive population. The existence of more than a few active minds is unlikely under a regime that itself actively promotes passivity. The despot will, if a good one, choose good ministers to oversee the various divisions of government, but few not so chosen will have the impetus to acquire more knowledge and intellectual capacity than their daily work requires of them.

"What sort of human beings," Mill asks, "can be formed under such a regimen?" Ones who avoided politics in all its practical manifestations, to be sure, he answers. "A person must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and for itself, who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise."

The moral capacities of the disenfranchised public will also be stunted. Unable to influence the doings of the society as a whole, individuals will have no reason to think beyond their own needs, no basis upon which to see their neighbors and countrymen as anything but competitors. Clearly, if society is to improve the populace, such a scheme is ill-suited to the task. That makes representative democracy the better choice.

Under a representative arrangement, all men who posses the franchise and/or who are occasionally called upon to perform some function for the public (like jury duty) will, of necessity, be required to improve themselves by the very act of so participating. Their rights as citizens are only secure of they are able to stand up for them, and disposed to do so. Participation does much to ensure that both conditions obtain. Further, "general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it…. [H]uman beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, self-protecting; and they only achieve a high degree of success in the struggle with Nature in proportion as they are self-dependent, relying on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than what others can do for them." So it follows that the more people there are who can participate in political life, the more vital the country's political sphere will be, and the more effective.

It is of great moral benefit to a man to be called upon to judge matters not directly of concern to himself, "to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by rule rather than his private partialities; to apply at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good." Such a practice requires him to familiarize himself with ideas of others who have more experience with the matters at hand and to set aside his own interests for the moment and form an impartial judgement. By utilizing the common citizen in this way, the state not only benefits in having a fresh perspective, but accomplishes its highest goal and improves the man as well. The man, in turn, "is made to feel himself as one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit." Mill asserts that even the smallest participation in the sovereign power of the state by the masses is of benefit.

In fact, Mills' two main concerns about representative democracy are the "danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body and in the popular opinion that controls it; and [the] danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority." Summing up a condition that might well be called the tyranny of the majority, Mills goes to considerable lengths to suggest a means of ensuring that minorities cannot be excluded from representation by unified majorities. It is too easy, as Mills demonstrates, for an actual numerical minority to come up with a majority in the legislature and restrict all law-making to measures that serve only their narrow interests. To counteract this tendency, Mills promotes two measures that would, he asserts, profoundly improve the representativeness – and intellectual quality – of a governing body.

First, he describes a means of proportional voting, first proposed by one Mr. Hare, in which, rather than simply casting a single vote for a local candidate each voter could instead cast numerous, weighted votes to a succession of candidates from a nationwide list in order of preference. First preference votes in excess of the number required to win would be discarded, and second (and succeeding) preferences considered until all available seats were filled in order of the voters' true preferences.

By widening the field beyond those persons who are able, by virtue of their wealth or local political connections, to have themselves placed on party ballots, this measure would have two effects. Foremost, it would ensure that every minority opinion would find itself represented, precisely in proportion to its prevalence in the population, in the legislature. Secondly, persons who are of high intellectual ability, ones which the current system discourages from standing for election, would be much more likely to offer themselves for consideration – and the political parties would be required to recommend a few of them that they envision would vote their way – improving the average intelligence of the legislature.

The overall effect would be to have a legislature composed entirely of persons who actually represent the people that voted for them, rather than a plurality of the voters in a certain geographic location, some of whom did not choose their 'representative.' "Every member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous constituency" and the relationship between representative and voter would truly be such that the voter knew that the person representing him was of his own choosing. Further, by ensuring that the whole spectrum of opinions have a voice in the representative body, this formulation would provide the vital competition of ideas that Mills identifies as the driving force of progress. "No community has ever long continued progressive, but while a conflict was going on between the strongest power in the community and some rival power." Strengthening the 'loyal opposition' serves to further this healthy competitive state against the stagnation and decline which are attendant upon "the exclusive predominance of a part only of the conditions of social and mental well-being."

Second, Mills strongly advocates allotting multiple votes to those who have proven themselves more capable of good judgement. University graduates, those who pass an impartial test, members of the "liberal professions" and the like, he avers, are degraded by having their single vote be no more potent than that of an uneducated man. To improve the quality of representation, he suggests that a framework be developed to allow the better educated to have a stronger voice, but leaves aside formulating it himself, knowing that the idea is too radical and too new for easy acceptance. Nevertheless, he harbors no doubts that instituting such a means for dispensing the franchise will improve both the level of contentment in the population and the quality of legislators chosen.

Mills asserts in numerous other texts that he considers utility the highest measure of any moral proposition. His ideas regarding the best way to conduct a representative government exemplify this belief. He is well aware of the possible discontent that will arise if large blocs of opinion that remain numerical minorities are left unheard and has directly addressed this problem with his proportional voting scheme. Further, just as Aristotle recognized, he has noted that the better qualified expect their superiority to be accounted for, and has offered a means to allay this concern and turn it to the public's good in the form of a better quality of elected official. The end of better governance, hence greater general happiness, thus achieved, the goals of utility are satisfied